Chapter 4 Part 2: LATE & Heterogeneous Effects

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Angrist & Pischke, Mostly Harmless Econometrics — Sections 4.4–4.5

Core Message

When treatment effects are heterogeneous (different people benefit differently), IV estimates the Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) — the causal effect specifically for compliers, the subpopulation whose treatment status is changed by the instrument.

Key questions this part answers:

  1. What does IV estimate with heterogeneous effects? → LATE (effect on compliers)
  2. Who are compliers? → People whose treatment changes with the instrument
  3. How does LATE relate to ATE and ATT? → Generally different, unless special cases apply
  4. How does 2SLS generalize? → Weighted average of covariate-specific LATEs

4.4 IV with Heterogeneous Potential Outcomes

Why Heterogeneity Matters

Constant effects (y1i − y0i = ρ for all i) is unrealistic. Different people benefit differently from treatment. This raises two concerns:

  • Internal validity: What exactly is IV estimating?
  • External validity: Do the results generalize to other populations?

Setup: Generalized Potential Outcomes

Define potential outcomes indexed by both treatment and instrument:

yi(d, z) = potential outcome for person i with treatment d and instrument z

d1i = treatment status if zi = 1
d0i = treatment status if zi = 0

4.4.1 The LATE Theorem (Imbens & Angrist, 1994)

Four Assumptions

Assumption Formal Statement Intuition
A1: Independence {yi(d,z), d1i, d0i} ⊥ zi Instrument is as good as randomly assigned
A2: Exclusion yi(d, 0) = yi(d, 1) for d = 0, 1 Instrument affects outcome only through treatment
A3: First stage E[d1i − d0i] ≠ 0 Instrument affects treatment on average
A4: Monotonicity d1i ≥ d0i for all i (or vice versa) No one is pushed away from treatment by the instrument

The LATE Theorem:

[E(yi|zi=1) − E(yi|zi=0)] / [E(di|zi=1) − E(di|zi=0)]
= E[y1i − y0i | d1i > d0i]

The IV estimand = average causal effect for compliers

Proof Sketch

Numerator (reduced form):

E[yi|z=1] − E[yi|z=0] = E[(y1i−y0i)(d1i−d0i)]

By monotonicity, (d1i−d0i) is 0 or 1, so this equals:

= E[y1i−y0i | d1i>d0i] × P[d1i>d0i]

Denominator (first stage): E[d1i−d0i] = P[d1i>d0i]

Dividing cancels the compliance probability, leaving LATE.

Why Monotonicity?

Without monotonicity, some people are "defiers" (d1i < d0i). The reduced form becomes:

E[(y1i−y0i)|compliers]·P[compliers] − E[(y1i−y0i)|defiers]·P[defiers]

Positive effects could be canceled by defiers, making the reduced form misleading. Monotonicity rules out this possibility.

4.4.2 The Compliant Subpopulation

The instrument partitions the population into three groups:

Group Definition Draft Lottery Example
Compliers d1i = 1, d0i = 0 Served because of draft eligibility
Always-takers d1i = d0i = 1 Volunteered regardless
Never-takers d1i = d0i = 0 Exempted / deferred regardless

LATE ≠ ATE ≠ ATT in general:

  • ATT (effect on the treated) = weighted average of effects on always-takers and compliers
  • ATE (average treatment effect) = weighted average of effects on all three groups
  • LATE = effect on compliers only

Special Cases: LATE = ATT or LATE = Effect on Non-treated

Scenario Example Why
No always-takers: E[d|z=0]=0 JTPA training experiment Treated = compliers only → LATE = ATT
No never-takers: d1i=1 for all i Twins instrument, Minneapolis DV experiment Non-treated = compliers only → LATE = E[y₁−y₀|d=0]

4.4.3 IV in Randomized Trials (Bloom 1984)

In a randomized trial with one-sided non-compliance (some offered treatment decline, but no control subject gets treatment), the IV estimand is the effect of treatment on the treated.

Bloom's Result: If E[di|zi=0] = 0 (no always-takers), then:

ITT / Compliance rate = E[y1i−y0i | di=1] = ATT

Example: JTPA Training Experiment

By Training Status (OLS) By Assignment (ITT) IV Estimate (ATT)
Men $3,970 $1,117 $1,825
Women $2,133 $1,243 $1,942

OLS (by actual training) overstates the effect due to selection. ITT understates it because only 60% complied. IV = ITT ÷ 0.6 gives the causal effect on compliers = ATT.

4.4.4 Counting and Characterizing Compliers

Size of Complier Group

P[d1i > d0i] = E[di|zi=1] − E[di|zi=0] = First stage

Proportion of Treated Who Are Compliers

P[d1i>d0i | di=1] = P[zi=1] × (First stage) / P[di=1]

Complier Characteristics

Although individual compliers can't be identified, the distribution of characteristics can be described:

Complier-characteristics ratio: For a binary characteristic x1i,

P[x1i=1 | complier] / P[x1i=1] = (First stage for x1i=1 subgroup) / (Overall first stage)

If this ratio > 1, compliers are disproportionately likely to have characteristic x₁.

Example: Complier Characteristics for Twins vs. Same-Sex Instruments

Characteristic Sample Mean Twins Ratio Same-Sex Ratio
Age ≥ 30 at first birth 0.003 1.39 1.00
College graduate 0.132 1.14 0.70

Twins compliers are older and more educated; same-sex compliers are less educated. This helps explain why twins IV gives smaller labor supply effects (labor supply consequences of childbearing decline with education).

4.5 Generalizing LATE

4.5.1 Multiple Instruments

With two instruments z1i and z2i, each having its own complier group, 2SLS produces:

ρ2SLS = λ·ρ1 + (1−λ)·ρ2

where ρj is the LATE using instrument j alone, and λ depends on the relative strength of each instrument in the first stage. Instruments with a stronger first stage get more weight.

4.5.2 Covariates in the Heterogeneous-Effects Model

When the instrument is only valid conditional on covariates Xi (e.g., draft eligibility conditional on year of birth):

Conditional independence: {y1i, y0i, d1i, d0i} ⊥ zi | Xi

Saturate and Weight Theorem (Angrist & Imbens 1995)

With a fully saturated first stage (separate effect of z for each value of X) and saturated covariates in the second stage, 2SLS estimates:

ρ2SLS = E[ω(Xi) · LATE(Xi)]

A weighted average of covariate-specific LATEs, with weights proportional to the variance of first-stage fitted values at each X value. Covariate values where the instrument creates more variation in treatment get more weight.

Abadie's Kappa Weighting (Abadie 2003)

2SLS approximates the causal response function for compliers: E[yi | di, Xi, complier]. The kappa-weighting function:

κi = 1 − di(1−zi) / (1−P(zi=1|Xi)) − (1−di)zi / P(zi=1|Xi)

"finds" compliers by down-weighting always-takers (d=1, z=0) and never-takers (d=0, z=1). With a linear model for P(z=1|X), Abadie's estimator equals 2SLS.

4.5.3 Average Causal Response with Variable Treatment Intensity

When treatment is multi-valued (e.g., years of schooling s ∈ {0, 1, …, S}), the Wald estimand becomes:

ACR Theorem (Angrist & Imbens 1995):

IV estimand = Σs ωs · E[Ys − Ys−1 | s1i ≥ s > s0i]

A weighted average of unit causal effects along the causal response function, with weights:

ωs = P[s1i ≥ s > s0i] / Σj P[s1i ≥ j > s0i]

Key insight: The weight at each point s is proportional to the shift in the CDF of treatment at that point, which can be estimated from data:

P[s1i ≥ s > s0i] = P[si < s | z=0] − P[si < s | z=1]

Application: Compulsory Schooling Laws

Acemoglu & Angrist (2000) show that child labor and compulsory attendance laws shift the schooling distribution mainly in grades 8–12, with no effect on post-secondary schooling. Therefore, IV estimates using these instruments capture returns to schooling in the high-school range, not the college range.

Continuous Treatment: Average Derivative

When treatment is continuous (e.g., price), the IV estimand is a weighted average derivative:

IV = ∫ q'(t) · ω(t) dt

Example: Angrist, Graddy & Imbens (2000) estimate the demand for fish at Fulton Fish Market using weather instruments. Stormy weather drives up prices, and IV recovers the demand elasticity averaged over the range of storm-induced price shifts.

Applied: Angrist & Evans (1998) — Fertility & Labor Supply

Research question: Does having a third child causally reduce female labor supply?

The Identification Problem

Simple OLS comparison of mothers with 2 vs. 3+ children confounds causation with selection: women who have more children may have inherently stronger family-orientation preferences, leading to both more children and less labor supply.

Core problem: Fertility is endogenous — unobservable preferences drive both the number of children and labor supply decisions simultaneously.

Two Instruments for a Third Child

Among mothers with ≥2 children, Angrist & Evans use two sources of exogenous variation:

Twins at second birth Same-sex (first two children)
Logic Twins mechanically create ≥3 children Parents prefer mixed-sex sibship → more likely to try for a third
First stage 0.625 (very strong) 0.067 (modest)
Validity Twin births are essentially random Child sex composition is random

Results

Outcome OLS Twins IV Same-sex IV
Employment −0.167 −0.083 −0.135
Weeks worked −8.05 −3.83 −6.23
Key observation: |OLS| > |Same-sex IV| > |Twins IV|. Same treatment, same outcome, but different estimates. Why?

Why Estimates Differ: Different Compliers

Each instrument identifies effects for a different complier subpopulation:

Twins compliers = mothers who would not have had a third child without twins

  • Older, more educated, established careers
  • Planned for 2 children → forced into 3 by twins
  • → Labor supply impact is smaller (career attachment buffers the shock)

Same-sex compliers = mothers who had a third child due to sex-mix preference

  • Younger, less educated, early career stage
  • Strong family composition preferences
  • → Labor supply impact is larger (less career attachment, higher opportunity cost)

Mapping to ATE / ATT / ITT / LATE

Estimand Definition In This Study
ATE E[Y(1)−Y(0)] for entire population Effect of 3rd child on all mothers with 2 children — not directly observed
ATT E[Y(1)−Y(0) | D=1] for treated Effect on mothers who actually had a 3rd child — OLS (−0.167) tries but is biased by selection
ITT E[Y|Z=1]−E[Y|Z=0] by assignment Effect of being assigned twins/same-sex — reduced form, always unbiased
LATE E[Y(1)−Y(0) | compliers] Twins: −0.083 | Same-sex: −0.135 — different compliers give different LATEs

Mathematical Relationships

ATE = E[Y₁−Y₀|C]·πC + E[Y₁−Y₀|AT]·πAT + E[Y₁−Y₀|NT]·πNT

ATT = E[Y₁−Y₀|C]·πC/(πCAT) + E[Y₁−Y₀|AT]·πAT/(πCAT)

ITT = LATE × πC (always unbiased, |ITT| ≤ |LATE|)

LATE = E[Y₁−Y₀ | Compliers] = ITT / First stage

Size Relationships

Relationship Condition
|ITT| < |LATE| Always (compliance rate < 1)
ATT ≥ ATE (typically) High-benefit individuals self-select into treatment
LATE = ATT No always-takers (Bloom 1984)
LATE₁ ≠ LATE₂ Different IVs → different compliers (Angrist & Evans)
LATE = ATE Homogeneous treatment effects (constant effect)

Method → Estimand Mapping

Method Estimates Generalizability
RCT (full compliance) ATE Broad
RCT (non-compliance) + IV LATE Compliers only
DID / Matching / PSM ATT Groups similar to treated
RDD LATE at cutoff Near cutoff only

Key lessons from Angrist & Evans:

  1. LATE ≠ ATE ≠ ATT. OLS (−0.167), Twins IV (−0.083), Same-sex IV (−0.135) all give different numbers for the same research question.
  2. Different instruments → different compliers → different LATEs. The choice of instrument determines whose effect you estimate.
  3. Complier characteristics explain the gap. The difference is systematic, not random — it traces back to demographics of each complier group.
  4. Policy implications change. −8% vs. −17% employment effects lead to completely different childcare policy conclusions.

Part 2 Summary

Concept Key Point
LATE IV = E[y₁−y₀ | compliers], not ATE or ATT in general
Four Assumptions Independence, Exclusion, First stage, Monotonicity
Monotonicity No defiers; all affected people are pushed in the same direction
Complier size = First stage; characteristics via first-stage ratio across subgroups
Bloom's Result One-sided non-compliance → LATE = ATT (e.g., JTPA)
Multiple instruments 2SLS = weighted average of instrument-specific LATEs
Covariates 2SLS = weighted average of covariate-specific LATEs
ACR Theorem Multi-valued treatment → weighted average of unit causal effects along the response function

Practical takeaway: Different instruments estimate effects for different subpopulations. Understanding who the compliers are is crucial for interpreting what your IV estimate means and whether it generalizes.

← Part 1: IV Basics, Wald & 2SLS Part 3: IV Details →
This note was written with the assistance of LLM (Claude).